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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT UTAH STATE ENGINEER

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is based on Section 78-22(3)(e)(v), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended; Rule 54(b),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; and Rule 4(a), Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Are Plaintiffs-Appellants "aggrieved persons" pursuant

to Section 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953 (effective until
January 1, 1988) so as to entitle them to seek review of a
Memorandum Decision of the State Engineer?
2.

Do the statutory criteria for the approval or rejection

of applications to appropriate water contained in Section 73-38, Utah Code Annotated 1953, also apply to the approval or
rejection of applications to change the point of diversion, place
or nature of use filed pursuant to Section 73-3-3, Utah Code
Annotated 1953?
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The relevant statutory provisions which are determinative
are Sections 73-3-3, 73-3-8 and 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended.
1

Section 73-3-3 was amended in 1986 to allow the filing of
change applications by the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources
for instream fishery purposes, and amended again in 1987 to
conform to the provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act (UAPA), Section 63-46b-l, et seq. The 1987 amendment also
resulted in some reorganization and rewording of this Section,
but the procedural and substantive criteria governing change
applications is unchanged and remains the same as when the
subject change application was approved by the State Engineer in
1985.

Agency actions (including judicial review) commenced prior

to the adoption of UAPA are governed by the statutes in effect
prior to the adoption of UAPA.

See Section 63-46b-22.

Sections

73-3-3, 73-3-8 and 73-3-14, in their relevant forms, are reproduced as Appendix f!A!f hereto.
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs filed this action in numerous counts seeking
redress for claimed flood damage to their property located in
Salt Lake County which they allege occurred due to certain
activities of the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District and
Draper Irrigation Company (co-applicants on the subject change
application).

The great majority of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended

Complaint ("Complaint") sounds in tort and is directed solely
toward Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District and Draper
2

Irrigation Company (R. 53). However, Count I of Plaintiffs1
Complaint raises a totally separate cause of action (R. 53-62).
Count I seeks a de novo review of the Memorandum Decision of the
Utah State Engineer dated December 26, 1985, which approved
Change Application No. 57-3411 (a-13077) filed by Salt Lake
County Water Conservancy District and Draper Irrigation Company.
A copy of the State Engineer's Memorandum Decision appears in
the Record at R. 80, and is attached hereto as Appendix "B".
In the court below, the State Engineer challenged Plaintiffs1 status as "aggrieved persons" to seek review of his decision approving the change application because Plaintiffs are not
water users and own no rights which could be impaired by the
change.

Further, both the State Engineer and the court below

found that the grounds for Plaintiffsf protest to the change were
outside of the statutory criteria for the approval or rejection
of change applications under Section 73-3-3, Utah Code Annotated.
The issues raised by this appeal do not go to the merits of
whether or not the change application should have been approved.
Rather, the issue is whether Plaintiffs have a statutory right to
seek such review at all.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Plaintiffs filed this action on February 24, 1986, seeking a
de novo review of the State Engineer's decision (Count I) and, in
3

other Counts, seeking damages and other relief against Salt Lake
County Water Conservancy District and Draper Irrigation Company
(R. 2) . The Complaint was amended in March of 1986 (R. 25), and
again in February of 1987 (R. 53).
The State Engineer filed his Answer (R. 132), raising
several affirmative defenses including:

(a) Plaintiffs are not

"aggrieved persons" within the meaning of Section 73-3-14; and
(b) the criteria set forth in Section 73-3-8 (on which Plaintiff
Bonham based his protest) are only applicable to applications for
new appropriations and not to applications to change existing
rights under Section 73-3-3 (R. 139). 1
On July 27, 1987, Plaintiffs filed a motion to strike the
above-stated defenses (R. 193, at 197).

The District Court

denied the motion to strike on August 31, 1987 (R. 288).
On September 8, 1987, the State Engineer filed a motion for
summary judgment on Count I (R. 293) based on the above-stated
defenses, which the District Court granted by Memorandum Decision
dated December 4, 1987 (R. 519). After some disagreement among
the parties as to whether judgment should be certified as a final
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) U.R.C.P., the District Court, on
March 14, 1988, issued its Judgment and Order and certified the

1. Identical defenses were raised by the other named
Defendants (R. 148-149, 168).
4

same under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P. (R. 599). 2

Copies of the Dis-

trict Court's Memorandum Decision and Judgment are attached
hereto as Appendix "C".
Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal on April 11, 1988
(R. 609). Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary disposition with
this Court on May 26, 1988, which was denied on June 7, 1988.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Contrary to Plaintiffs1 assertions, the material facts
relevant to the granting of Summary Judgment in this case are
neither complex or controverted.
Change Application No. 57-3411 (a-13077) was filed by Salt
Lake County Water Conservancy District and Draper Irrigation
Company pursuant to Section 73-3-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended (R. 80). The application sought to change the point of
diversion, place and nature of use of certain water rights in
Bell Canyon, the Middle and South Forks of Dry Creek, Rocky Mouth
and Big Willow Creeks (R. 80-81).

By the change, Salt Lake

County Water Conservancy District proposed to convey the water to
its treatment plant for use by its municipal customers (R. 81).
Notice of the change application was published in the

2. Summary Judgment was granted only as to Count I (the
appeal from the State Engineer's decision). The other Counts of
the Second Amended Complaint—directed to the other named Defendants—remain ongoing in the District Court.
5

Deseret News from June 28, 1984, through July 12, 1984 (R. 81)•
Of the named Plaintiffs, only Stanley Bonham protested the change
application, and there were no protests filed by any water users
(R. 81). Plaintiff Bonham's protest was based on his allegations
that the proposed change would cause flooding of his and other
property and would therefore be detrimental to the public welfare
(R. 81).
Plaintiffs have not alleged that they own any water rights
in the subject area, nor have they alleged that the proposed
change would impair any vested water rights owned by them (R. 5362).

Indeed, Plaintiffs own no water rights (see Affidavit of

Kent Jones, R. 291-292, and Appendix l!D!l hereto), and Plaintiffs
so concede (see Appellants1 Brief at p. 26).
On February 26, 1985, a hearing was held by the State
Engineer on the subject change application which was attended by
the applicants and protestant Stanley Bonham (R. 81). Subsequent
to the hearing, the State Engineer had members of his staff
conduct a field examination of the area at which representatives
of the applicants and Mr. Bonham were present (R. 81).
On December 26, 1985, the State Engineer issued his Memorandum Decision (Appendix "B" hereto) approving the change application on the grounds that:

(1) the State Engineer had no statu-

tory authority in acting upon the change application to consider
damage to land that may be caused by project construction, and
6

such concerns were not relevant to the change application process; and (2) there was no evidence to indicate that the proposed
change would interfere with other existing water rights (R. 81)•
Plaintiffs then filed this action seeking a de novo review
of the State Enginer's decision (Count I), and in other Counts
seeking damages and other relief against co-applicants Salt Lake
County Water Conservancy District and Draper Irrigation Company
(R. 53) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State Engineer's motion for summary judgment was based
on the propositions that (1) Plaintiffs were not "aggrieved
persons" under Section 73-3-14 and therefore lacked standing to
appeal the State Engineer's decision, and (2) the criteria on
which Plaintiffs based their protest were not applicable to
change applications.

The motion was entirely appropriate in that

it challenged Plaintiffs1 basic right to maintain Count I of the
Complaint, and was clearly ripe for adjudication at an early
stage of the proceeding.

The relevant facts underlying that

motion are not controverted.
In a nutshell, our position is that the statutory water
rights change application process is narrow in scope and is
governed exclusively by Section 73-3-3, and the only issue before
the State Engineer, the District Court, and this Court on appeal
7

is whether there is reason to believe that the subject change
could be accomplished without impairing other vested water
rights.

Plaintiffs are not water users and have no water rights

to be impaired by the subject change; they therefore cannot be
"aggrieved parties" under Section 73-3-14.

The concerns they

raise, even if valid, are outside the limited statutory criteria
governing the approval or rejection of change applications, and,
unless Plaintiffs can demonstrate that they have interests within
the "zone" the change application process is meant to protect or
regulate, they cannot seek review of the State Engineer's
decision.
Plaintiffs' attempt to gain "aggrieved person" status by
alleging that the broader criteria governing new applications to
appropriate under Section 73-3-8 also apply to change applications.

They are wrong.

The only criteria for the approval or

rejection of a change application is whether there is reason to
believe that the change can be made without impairing other
vested water rights.

Plaintiffs cannot be deemed to be "ag-

grieved persons" since they cannot meet their statutory burden of
showing that the change will impair their water rights—because
they own none.

Sound statutory construction, the legislative

history of Section 73-3-3, and existing caselaw are contrary to
Plaintiffs' contention that the criteria of Section 73-3-8 apply
to change applications.

Further, since the only criteria for the
8

approval or rejection of a change application is the impairment
of other water rights, Plaintiffs not only lack the right to seek
review of the State Engineer's decision, but could not prevail on
the merits even if the matter were to go to trial.
It should be emphasized that the granting of Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs on Count I of the Complaint does not
leave them without viable remedies for alleged flood damage
arising out of the activities of Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District and Draper Irrigation Company.

The granting of

Summary Judgment on Count I left intact Plaintiffs1 other claims
for damages, inverse condemnation, and injunctive relief as
against the other Defendants below (see Complaint, R. 62-79; and
the Judgment of the District Court, R. 599-601, Appendix nC!f) .
All of such other claims provide Plaintiffs with a full opportunity to air those issues before the District Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

The State Engineer's Motion For Summary Judcrment
Challenges Plaintiffs1 Basic Right To Appeal From
The State Engineer's Decision As A Matter Of Law,
And Is Ripe For Determination,

In Point 1 of their brief, Plaintiffs claim the State
Engineerfs motion for summary judgment is not ripe for determination (Appellants1 Brief, p. 14). Plaintiffs thus misunderstand
what this appeal is all about, and the arguments in Point 1 of
their brief beg the question on the issues now before the Court.
9

The State Engineer's motion for summary judgment was not
directed to the merits of the case per se. Rather, it was
directed to whether or not (regardless of Plaintiffs1 factual
allegations) Plaintiffs were entitled as a matter of law to seek
an appeal from the State Engineer's Memorandum Decision.

The

issue is whether Plaintiffs are "aggrieved persons" under Section
73-3-14 and have standing to bring this action at all.

It is a

question going to the basic jurisdiction of the Court, and was
properly raised and decided as a matter of law.
The State Engineer's motion for summary judgment was based
on two separate affirmative defenses raised in his Answer.

The

Fifth Defense of the Answer stated, "Plaintiffs are not aggrieved
parties under the provisions of Section 73-3-14 . . . and therefore lack standing and are otherwise not entitled to prosecute
this appeal" (R. 139). Thus, the basic capacity of Plaintiffs to
bring this action (Count I) was called into question.
The Sixth Defense raised the issue of whether the criteria
of Section 73-3-8—the sole basis of Plaintiffs' protest to the
subject change application—were applicable, as a matter of law,
to change applications filed under Section 73-3-3.

If those

criteria are inapplicable (and we claim they are not), Plaintiffs
have no legal basis for objecting to the change application.
Both of these defenses raise questions of law, and were
properly decided by summary judgment.
10

This is an action to review an administrative decision of
the State Engineer pursuant to Section 73-3-14.

Unless Plain-

tiffs are "aggrieved persons11 they have no right to seek such
review.

This issue will be discussed in more detail in Point

II, infra.

Plaintiffs have a right to seek review of an ad-

ministrative decision only where the legislature has so provided.
In a very recent case, the Utah Court of Appeals denied review of
an administrative decision where the statute did not so provide:
This general statute [Section 78-2a-3(2)(a)] defines
the outermost limits of our appellate jurisdiction,
allowing us to review agency decisions only when the
legislature expressly authorizes a right of review
[citing authority]. It is not a catchall provision
authorizing us to review the orders of every administrative agency for which there is no statute specifically creating a right to judicial review. In the
absence of such a specific statute, we have no jurisdiction." DeBry v. Salt Lake County Board of Appeals,
Utah Court of Appeals No. 87 0004-CA, decided November
8, 1988. Slip Op. at 2. (A copy of the Court of
Appeals decision is attached hereto as Appendix "E".)
In the case of judicial review of decisions of the Utah
State Engineer, the legislature has provided that only persons
legally "aggrieved" may seek such review.

Thus, the State

Engineerfs motion for summary judgment goes to whether or not
Plaintiffs meet this standard.
Plaintiffs argue there are factual disputes which require
the taking of evidence (Appellants1 Brief, pp. 14-19).

Not so.

We claimed—and the District Court held—that the change application process under Section 73-3-3 is narrow in scope, and the
11

only issue before the State Engineer and the courts on appeal is
whether there is reason to believe that the change could be made
without impairing other vested water rights (R. 52 0-521, Appendix
"C").

That being the case, the only material fact relevant to

whether Plaintiffs are "aggrieved persons" under Section 73-3-14
is whether they own water rights which might be impaired by the
change.
It is uncohtroverted that Plaintiffs do not own any water
rights (see Affidavit of Kent Jones, R. 291-292, Appendix "D").
Plaintiffs in fact concede they do not own any water rights
(Appellant's Brief, p. 26). The "facts" which Plaintiffs claim
are disputed relate to the merits of their claim—not to the
threshold issue of whether they are "aggrieved persons" having
standing to bring the action in the first place.

"Standing

doctrines [or aggrieved person status in administrative appeals]
are employed to refuse to determine the merits of a legal claim,
on the ground that even though the claim may be correct, the
litigant advancing it is not properly situated to be entitled to
its judicial determination."

Wright and Miller, Section 3531.

As the United States Supreme Court has stated, " . . .

[T]he

standing question . . . is whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to
judicial relief."

Warth v. Seldin, 442 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
12

The standing doctrine focuses on the particular plaintiff, not on
the issues or merits of the case.
680, 685 (C.A. 5th 1982).

See O'Hair v. White, 675 F.2d

"One who is not 'aggrieved1 by a

decision—however erroneous—may not bring a challenge to its
validity."

Northwest Datsun v. Oklahoma Motor Vehicle Comm'n,

736 P.2d 516, 520 (Okla. 1987).3
This Court has noted that "the mere existence of genuine
issues of fact in the case as a whole does not preclude the entry
of summary judgment if those issues are immaterial to resolution
of the case." Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751
(Utah 1982).

See also Abdulkadir v. Western Pacific R.R. Co., 7

Ut.2d 53, 318 P.2d 339 (1957); Healer Ranch, Inc., v. Stillman,
619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980); Reagan Outdoor Advertising v.
Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984); and Norton v. Blackham,
669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983).
The only material fact in determining whether or not Plaintiffs are "aggrieved persons" is whether they own water rights—
and it is uncontroverted that they do not. Any other perceived
factual disputes are simply irrelevant to that issue.
Plaintiffs cite Crafts v. Hansen, 667 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985),

3. Plaintiffs certainly did not believe the issue to be
premature when they filed their motion to strike this defense.
In fact, the arguments in support of Plaintiffs1 motion to strike
are in direct conflict with those in Point I of their brief (R.
193-200, 201-235).
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for the proposition that it is impossible to obtain summary
judgment in reviewing a decision of the State Engineer.
not an accurate statement.

That is

Crafts dealt with a reversal of

summary judgment on the merits where there were conflicting
expert affidavits (667 P.2d at 1080).
with standing.4

That case did not deal

The Court in Crafts noted:

We do not mean to suggest by this
summary judgment is not available
concerning a determination of the
Where the requirements of Rule 56
party would of course be entitled
at 1080-1081.)

observation that
in a hearing de novo
State Engineer.
are met, a moving
to relief. (667 P.2d

Plaintiffs seem to suggest that a full hearing on the merits is
necessary to determine the threshold issue of whether Plaintiffs
have a right to maintain this action.
does not make any sense.
or they are not.

Such is not the law, and

Either Plaintiffs are aggrieved persons

The lower court held they were not, and proper-

ly granted our motion for summary judgment.
Next, Plaintiffs argue that there is a factual dispute as to
"whether the State Engineer properly performed his statutory
duties pursuant to the provisions of Section 73-3-8" to determine
whether the change application would be detrimental to the public
welfare (Appellant!s Brief at p. 18). This again begs the

4. In fact, this Court in Crafts affirmed a partial summary
judgment dismissing the action as against parties who were not
water users (667 P.2d at 1081, Note 6).
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question.

The issue before the District Court on summary judg-

ment was whether the criteria of Section 73-3-8 were applicable
to change applications at all. That is a question of law to be
determined by statutory construction, and does not involve any
facts—disputed or otherwise.

Since, as we will demonstrate in

Point III, infra, the criteria of Section 73-3-8 are not applicable to change applications, it is totally irrelevant whether
or not the State Engineer undertook an investigation into those
issues.

Further, since Plaintiffs do not own any water rights,

and since the only issue before the State Engineer is whether the
proposed change will impair other vested water rights, it would
be impossible for Plaintiffs to prevail on the merits if the
criteria of Section 73-3-8 are inapplicable to change applications.

Thus, the applicability of the Section 73-3-8 criteria

goes—as a matter of law—to the issue of whether Plaintiffs can
even state a cause of action.
Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that the granting of summary
judgment denied them access to the courts under the Utah Constitution.

That claim is improperly raised and lacks merit.

First of all, this argument is improperly raised for the
first time on appeal.

Other than a passing reference in Plain-

tiffs1 memorandum in opposition to summary judgment (R. 491),
there is nothing in the record or in Plaintiffs1 docketing
statement to indicate that this issue was directly raised below,
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and it cannot now be presented for the first time on appeal:
11

. . . it is axiomatic that matters not presented to
the trial court may not be raised for the first time on
appeal.11 (Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development
Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983).)
See also Shavne v. Stanley & Sons, Inc., 605 P.2d 775 (Utah
1980), and Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977).

This

fundamental principle of appellate practice applies to constitutional issues as well as other matters. Madsen v. Brown, 701
P.2d 1086, 1088 (Utah 1985), and Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320
(Utah 1982).
As discussed above, a person does not have an absolute right
to seek judicial review of agency action unless the legislature
so provides.

See DeBry v. Salt Lake County Board of Appeals,

supra, slip opinion, Appendix "E". Clearly, Plaintiffs have a
right to pursue their actions in tort and injunction against Salt
Lake County Water Conservancy District and Draper Irrigation
Company, and they are not without a remedy in the courts.
However, they cannot transform the narrow statutory administrative process dealing with change applications into a broad
panacea for all of the grievances set forth in their Complaint.
Plaintiffs1 argument that the motion for summary judgment
was premature must fail.

The motion was directed to the thresh-

old issue of whether Plaintiffs are "aggrieved persons" and
whether the broader criteria of Section 73-3-8 are applicable to
16

change applications.

As to those issues of law, there is no

material factual dispute.
POINT II: Plaintiffs Are Not Aggrieved Persons Under
Section 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated.
This is not a proper appeal from a decision of the State
Engineer as Plaintiffs allege.
at stake.

Plaintiffs1 water rights are not

Plaintiffs are attempting to use the State Engineer's

administrative process to stop the construction of waterworks
facilities which they allege will damage their real property.
Plaintiffs do not own any water rights, nor do they allege that
any such rights will be impaired (see Affidavit of Kent Jones, R.
291-292, Appendix

lf ff

D ) .

Plaintiffs, not being water users, cannot be aggrieved
persons under Section 73-3-14, and cannot pursue this appeal.5
Plaintiffs are free to pursue any action based on damages or
other legal theories against Salt Lake County Water Conservancy
District or Draper Irrigation Company (if any exist),6 but such
matters are clearly improper in the context of an action to
5. Other than Plaintiff Bonham, none of the other Plaintiffs were parties before the State Engineer. That alone would
deprive them of "aggrieved person11 status. See Eikenberger v.
Nevada State Board of Accountancy, 531 P.2d 853 (Nev. 1975), and
Colorado Water Quality Control Commfn v. Town of Frederick, 641
P.2d 958 (Colo. 1982).
6. Those causes of action—the remaining Counts of the
Complaint—are still pending below and are unaffected by the
granting of summary judgment on Count I.
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review an administrative decision of the State Engineer on a
change application.

In their effort to seek monetary damages and

other relief, Plaintiffs want to transform the administrative
process governing change applications into something not permitted by the Utah Water Code or the decisions of this Court.
The statutory process governing changes in point of diversion, place or nature of use of water is set forth in Section 733-3, and is narrow and limited in nature.

A water user in Utah

has the statutory right to change the point of diversion, place
or nature of use of his water right so long as there is no
impairment of other vested water rights or enlargement of the
right being changed.

The administrative process involving change

applications (including appeals) is for the protection of vested
water rights and the proper administration of the Statef s water
resources—nothing more.

Section 73-3-3 provides in part that:

Any person entitled to the use of water may change the
place of diversion or use and may use the water for
other purposes than those for which it was originally
appropriated, but no such change may be made if it
impairs any vested right without just compensation.
Any change in the point of diversion or in the place or
nature of use can only be accomplished upon the approval of the
State Engineer.

An application must be filed, and notice given

to other water users.

See Glenwood Irrigation Company v. Myers,

24 Utah 2d 78, 465 P.2d 1013 (1970).

The administrative process

includes the publishing of notice of the proposed change in a
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local newspaper once a week for three weeks (Section 73-3-6), and
an opportunity for protests to be filed (Section 73-3-7).

If the

application is protested, the State Engineer then holds a hearing
on the matter.

In this proceeding, not one water user filed a

protest claiming the change would impair any vested water rights.
All the State Engineer determines in connection with a change
application is whether there is reason to believe the proposed
change can be made without impairing other vested water rights.
As this Court stated in Crafts v. Hansen, 667 P.2d 1068, 1070
(Utah 1983):
Thus, it is the State Engineer's obligation before
approving a change application, to determine that no
vested water right will be impaired by the proposed
change. On plenary review, the trial court has the
same obligation. This Court has described the standard
for that determination as follows:
If the evidence shows that there is reason to
believe that the proposed change can be made
without impairing vested rights the application
should be approved. The owner of a water right
has a vested right to the quality as well as the
quantity which he has beneficially used. A change
application cannot be rejected without a showing
that vested rights will thereby be substantially
impaired. While the applicant has the general
burden of showing that no impairment of vested
rights will result from the change, the person
opposing such application must fail if the evidence does not disclose that his rights will be
impaired. Salt Lake City v. Boundary Springs
Water Users Assfn., 2 Utah 2d 141, 143-144, 270
P.2d 453, 455 (1954). (Emphasis added.)
The reason for protecting other vested rights—even if
junior in priority—makes sense.
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Other existing users are

entitled to have stream or groundwater conditions exist as they
did when they made their appropriations.

A water user, even with

an earlier priority, cannot by change application increase his
historic depletion of water to the detriment of other existing
water users.

See Piute Res, & Irr. Co, v. West Panguitch Irr. &

Res, Co,, 13 Utah 2d 6, 8, 367 P.2d 855 (1962); East Bench Irr,
Co, v, Deseret Irr, Co., 2 Utah 2d 170, 177, 271 P.2d 449 (1954);
Salt Lake City v. Boundary Springs Water Users Assfn, 2 Utah 2d
141, 270 P.2d 453 (1954); United States v. Fourth District Court,
121 Utah 18, 24, 242 P.2d 774 (1952); and Daniel Irrigation Co,
v, Daniel Summit Co,, 571 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1977).

The specific

statutory criteria governing the approval and rejection of change
applications is discussed in more detail in Point III, infra.
The narrow administrative process provided for in Section
73-3-3 is to protect other vested water rights while allowing
changes in water rights where no enlargement or impairment
occurs.

That is the limited "zone of interest" to be protected

by the administrative process, and Plaintiffs1 claim that the
proposed change will damage their real property does not fall
within it.7

7. Interests other than impairment of water rights are
considered by the State Engineer in passing on applications to
appropriate water under Section 73-3-8, but, as discussed in
Point III, infra, such criteria do not apply to change applications.
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The only issue that could properly be raised before the
State Engineer was impairment.

Court review of the State En-

gineer's decisions is likewise strictly limited to those issues
which could have been raised before the State Engineer (Crafts v.
Hansen, supra).

Unless Plaintiffs can demonstrate impairment of

a water right, they were not properly before the State Engineer
below and are not proper parties to seek this review.8
All final decisions of the State Engineer are subject to
judicial review as provided for in Sections 73-3-14 and 73-3-15,
Utah Code Annotated.

Section 73-3-14 specifies in part:

In any case where a decision of the state engineer is
involved any person aggrieved by such decision may
within sixty days after notice thereof bring a civil
action in the district court for a plenary review
thereof.
Section 73-3-15 provides that " . . . the hearing in the district
court shall proceed as a trial de novo . . .."

Thus, the legis-

lature carefully structured the appeals provision of the Utah
Water Code to give those water users involved in the administrative process before the State Engineer the right to review
8. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature in
providing for a fairly narrow process in acting on change applications. However, this Court has noted, in passing on the
statutory two-year limitation on prosecuting appeals from State
Engineer decisions, that:
Some may not approve the legislation, subject of this
case, . . . . We are not they that may question the
wisdom of the legislature on any constitutional or
prejudiciality basis under the circumstances here.
(Dansie v. Lambert, 542 P.2d 742 (Utah 1975).
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actions taken by the State Engineer, but limited such review to
those matters which could have properly been presented to and
decided by the State Engineer.

Certainly this gives any water

user aggrieved by a decision of the State Engineer ample opportunity to have his day in court, but it likewise protects and
preserves the administrative structure by preventing other issues
not relevant to a specific decision from being prematurely litigated or raised in an inappropriate forum.

Any other result

would effectively undermine the administrative process by allowing water users to raise on appeal a variety of issues which may
not be related to the specific decision in question.

Such a

result is neither prejudicial nor unfair to the parties to such
appeal, and is essential to the preservation of the administrative structure provided for in the Utah Water Code.
If there were any doubt about the legislative intent in this
regard, this Court has laid that matter to rest.

A number of

decisions have addressed this subject and have consistently and
uniformly held that the trial court's review is a limited one and
is confined to those issues which the statute delegated to the
State Engineer to decide in the first instance:
The statutes governing these actions, U.C.A.,
1953, §§73-3-14 & 15, specify that a party aggrieved by
a decision of the State Engineer is entitled to "plenary review11 in the district court, and that f![t]he
hearing in the district court shall proceed as a trial
de novo and shall be tried to the court as other
equitable actions." The issues at such hearing are,
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however, strictly limited to those which were, or could
have been, raised before the State Engineer. (Crafts
v. Hansen, supra, at 1070; Emphasis added.)
This Court had earlier explained that:
Such action is strictly limited to the trial of such
issues as could have been raised before the engineer,
and an appeal to this court is provided from the
decision of the district court. The decision of these
courts on such an appeal from the State Engineerf s
decision has the same effect and no more on the rights
of the applicants to proceed with their proposed
project as the decision of the engineer would have had
without an appeal. (East Bench Irrigation Co. v.
State, 5 Utah 2d 235, 239, 300 P.2d 603 (1956).)
See also United States v. Fourth District Court, 121 Utah 1, 238
P.2d 1132 (1951), rehearing denied 121 Utah 18, 242 P.2d 774
(1952).
Not only is our position supported by the law governing
change applications, it is also supported by legal principles
governing participation in administrative actions generally.

In

many ways a person's status as an "aggrieved party" in an administrative proceeding is akin to standing.
equate the terms.

In fact, most cases

The general rule is that even if some "injury"

can be shown by a plaintiff because of administrative action,
plaintiff nevertheless will lack standing to challenge administrative action unless the alleged injury is to an interest within
the "zone of interest" sought to be regulated or protected by the
statutes and agency.

In Gifford-Hill & Co., Inc., v. Federal

Trade Comm'n, 523 F.2d 730, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the Court of
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Appeals stated:
A plaintiff has standing to challenge an administrative
action . . . if the challenged action caused it "injury
in fact" and if "the alleged injury was to an interest
1
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected
or regulated1 by the statutes the agencies were claimed
to have violated." (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiffs allege that they "have an economic as well as a
direct, personal interest in the State Engineer's decision."

But

they have no water rights, and the "zone of interest" sought to
be protected in the change application process is other vested
water rights—nothing else.
Plaintiffs criticize us for not citing the Court to Clarice
v. Securities Industries Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 107 S.Ct. 750, 93
L.Ed.2d 757 (1987) (Appellants1 Brief at 34).
unwarranted.

Such criticism is

Clarke generally stands for the above-quoted

proposition that the alleged harm must come within the "zone"
sought to be regulated.

However, it must be remembered that

federal regulatory programs generally—and the regulatory scheme
involved in Clarke specifically—are usually much broader in
scope than the narrow administrative process involved in change
applications.

In Clarke, a large national bank had applied to

the Comptroller of the Currency under the McFadden Act for
permission to establish affiliate discount brokerage services at
its branch offices and at other locations outside its home state.
The application was granted.

A trade association representing
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securities brokers and investment bankers appealed the approval
of the permit.

The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was

within the "zone of interest" and had standing since the interests it was asserting had a reasonable relationship with the
policies underlying the McFadden Act, which sought to keep
national banks from gaining a monopoly over credit and banking
generally.

Regulation of the national banking industry is

obviously a broad regulatory scheme, as are many other federal
administrative programs.

That, however, is a far cry from the

very narrow process for acting on change applications as set
forth in Section 73-3-3, and Clarke is simply distinguishable on
its facts. As this Court observed in Terracor v. Utah Board of
State Lands, 716 P.2d 796 (Utah 1986), " . . . it is difficult to
make useful, all inclusive generalizations that determine whether
standing exists in any given case, since the issue often depends
on the facts of each case."

Likewise, the other cases cited by

Plaintiffs all involved broad regulatory schemes.
We submit that state court cases applying the "zone of
interest" test to more narrow regulatory programs are much more
akin to the case at bar than federal cases.

One such case is

Waste Management of Wisconsin, Inc., v. Wisconsin Department of
Natural Resources, 424 N.W.2d 685 (Wis. 1988).

In that case,

Wisconsin had created a program for the licensing and regulation
of sanitary landfills, under which the State Department of
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Natural Resources was to make determinations of the feasibility
and need for any new or proposed landfills.

Pursuant to this

program, a landfill operator filed an application to construct a
new landfill. Waste Management, Inc., filed a protest to the
granting of the permit, claiming the construction of the new
landfill would divert business away from its existing facility in
the same general area and would cause it economic harm because of
increased competition.

The state agency considered the protest,

but nevertheless issued the permit for the new facility.

Waste

Management, Inc., sought review in the courts, and the issue was
whether the company was an aggrieved party entitled to seek
judicial review of the agency action.

The Wisconsin Supreme

Court held that even if the plaintiff would suffer some economic
injury by the granting of the permit, such injury was not within
the "zone of interest" the regulatory program was intended to
protect and ruled that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge
the agency decision.

That Court first outlined the zone of

interest test as follows:
The Wisconsin rule of standing envisions a two-step
analysis conceptually similar to the analysis required
by the federal rule. The first step under the Wisconsin rule is to ascertain whether the decision of the
agency directly causes injury to the interest of the
petitioner. The second step is to determine whether
the interest asserted is recognized by law. This
approach is similar to the two-pronged standing analysis outlined by the United States Supreme Court ... as
follows: (1) Does the challenged action cause the
petitioner injury in fact? and (2) is the interest
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allegedly injured arguably within the zone of interests
to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question? (424 N.W.2d at 687.)
The Court then reasoned that even if Waste Management, Inc.,
could show some injury attributable to the granting of the
permit, the injury was not within the zone of interest sought to
be protected:
Turning to the dispositive question . . . under the
two-step analysis employed in these cases, the controlling issue is whether the economic injury which
Waste Management alleges it will suffer is an injury to
an interest of a type recognized, regulated, or sought
to be protected by sec. 144.44(2)(nm), Stats.
fid, at 688).
*

*

*

*

The nature of the statute, as well as the nature
of the determination of need, make clear that the
interest protected, recognized, or regulated by the law
is an environmental interest. In this case, the
environmental issue is the appropriate ultimate disposition of solid waste in a densely populated eightcounty corner of the state.
In this context, an argument for standing based on
alleged harm to an economic interest must fail. The
statute at issue here . . . does not recognize, nor
does it attempt to recrulate or protect an economic
interest. For this reason, an alleged harm to Waste
Management's economic interest does not satisfy the
second part of the two-step
analysis . . . . (Id. at
689; Emphasis added.)3
9. Plaintiffs argue that since the State Engineer allowed
Plaintiff Bonham to participate at the administrative level, that
gives them status as aggrieved persons. The Wisconsin Court
disposed of a similar argument as follows:
Under Wisconsin law, it is clear that, just
because a party has requested and been granted an
administrative hearing, the party does not obtain
thereby the standing to challenge the resulting administrative decision. [Citing authority.] (424
N.W.2d at 686, N.2).
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The analogy of Waste Management to the case at bar is clear•
As in Waste Management, here we have a very narrow administrative
process geared solely to allowing changes in water rights so long
as other water rights are not impaired.
are not within that narrow "zone."

Plaintiffs1 interests

Like Waste Managementf

"Plaintiffs have alleged . . . their personal, economic and
direct interest in the Engineer's Memorandum Decision" (Appellants1 Brief, p. 25). That is not enough to make them "aggrieved
persons."
Another analogous case is Northwest Datsun v. Oklahoma Motor
Vehicle Comm'n, 736 P.2d 516 (Okla. 1987).

In that case, an

Oklahoma statute prohibited the licensing of new car dealerships
within a ten-mile radius of an existing dealership selling the
same make of cars.

The applicant sought a dealership license

which was granted by the Motor Vehicle Commission.

Other dealers

sued, seeking an injunction against the issuance of the license.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the protesting dealers
lacked standing because they were all located outside of the tenmile radius.

The Court stated:

This statute clearly does give standing to protest the
establishment of a new dealer franchise to other
dealers of the same line-make located within ten miles
of the proposed site of the new franchise. However, in
the present case, appellant dealers of the same linemake are not located within ten miles of the new
franchise which they seek to challenge. The trial
court correctly ruled that this statute did not grant
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appellants the requisite standing to require OMVC to
consider their objection to the proposed new franchise.
(736 P.2d at 518.)
*

*

*

*

As reflected in section 579(5), the Legislature
was cognizant in passing this legislation that competition, if fair, is in the public interest. The Legislature made a choice in this legislation to regard the
establishment of a new dealership in an area more than
ten miles distant from an established dealer as presumptively fair competition and in the public interest.
This legislation provides for no protest in that event,
and it is quite clear that we may not infer an intent
to the contrary. (Id. at 519.)
*

*

*

*

. . . The legislation does not provide for protests
outside of those circumstances. Any attempt by OMVC to
provide for protests outside of those authorized by the
legislation would be beyond its authority. For this
reason appellants again lack a legally cognizable
interest in the issue tendered for determination. . .
. As stated by this Court in Democratic Party of
Oklahoma v. Estep, "One who is not 'aggrieved1 by a
decision—however erroneous—may not bring a challenge
to its validity." (Id. at 520.)
See also Ruidoso State Bank v. Brumlow, 467 P.2d 395 (N.M. 1970).
In Deseret Mortuary Co. v. State Securities Comm!ny 78 Utah
393, 3 P.2d 267 (1931), this Court rendered a decision quite
close in reasoning to the more recent "zone of interest" cases.
In that case, Deseret sought permission from the State Securities
Commission to register stock for public sale.

The Utah Funeral

Director's Association and the Ogden Chamber of Commerce protested the proposed registration and appealed the Commission
ruling allowing it.

The Court held that the two entities lacked

standing because the administrative process was limited in scope
and was geared to protecting "issuers, dealers or salesmen of
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securities," and that only those persons had standing.

Likewise,

the administrative process here is geared only toward the protection of other vested water rights.
This Court's decision in Terracor v. Utah Board of State
Lands, 716 P.2d 796 (Utah 1986), is also instructive.

In that

case plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus against the Board of
State Lands to rescind a special use lease issued to a competitor, which plaintiff claimed was issued in violation of State
law.

This Court (sua sponte) held that plaintiff lacked standing

to challenge the Board action because it had relinquished its
claim to the property.

Here, Plaintiffs have no water rights

which could be impaired by the proposed change.
Because water is the lifeblood of this arid State, much of
the varied development that occurs here is dependent on a water
supply.

Decisions of the State Engineer regarding the allocation

and distribution of water may thus indirectly or collaterally
affect many interests of many people.

However, the change

application process, as created by the legislature in Section 733-3 is for the limited purpose of controlling the change of water
rights while protecting other water users from any impairment to
their rights which the change may cause.

People or groups may be

opposed to the granting of a change application because of the
attendant ramifications thereof; but, unless they are water users
themselves, they cannot be "aggrieved persons" under the stat30

utory administrative process so as to entitle them to appeal a
State Engineerfs decision.
Contrary to Plaintiffs1 unsubstantiated assertions (Appellants1 Brief, p. 27), the State Engineer does not consider
himself to be "above the law" in challenging Plaintiffs1 standing
to seek review of the subject Memorandum Decision.
contrary.

Quite the

The State Engineer has a legitimate interest in pre-

serving the integrity of his administrative processes and in
limiting the issues before him to those within the authority
granted him by the legislature.
but is his duty.

That is not only appropriate,

For Plaintiffs to claim otherwise is both wrong

and inappropriate.
Plaintiffs also allege that in granting the subject change
application, the State Engineer is somehow to blame for the
alleged flood damage to their property.
absurdity.

That argument borders on

There is simply no logical cause and effect relation-

ship between the granting of the change application and the
alleged damage suffered by Plaintiffs. All the State Engineer's
decision did was to approve a change in point of diversion and
place and nature of use of a water right.

It certainly did not

authorize the applicants to damage or take any of Plaintiffs'
property.

How an applicant physically accomplishes a change is

the applicant's responsibility.

If, in the process of making a

change in point of diversion or place or nature of use of the
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water, the water user causes damage to the property of others he
may well be held liable for any such damage.
concern of the State Engineer.

But that is not the

Further, State law requires all

water users to use due care in their use of water.

Section 73-1-

8 states:
The owner of any ditch, canal, flume or other watercourse shall maintain the same in repair so as to
prevent waste of water or damage to the property of
others . . . (Emphasis added.)
At the risk of being repetitive, it is to be emphasized
that the granting of summary judgment in favor of the State
Engineer as to Count I has no effect whatsoever on Plaintiffs1
other claims for damages and injunctive relief.

Those claims are

set forth in great detail under various legal theories in the
other Counts of the Complaint (R. 62-79), and are still actively
pending against the other named Defendants in the lower court.
Plaintiffs will have their day in court on those causes of action
and are not left without a remedy.10

Plaintiffs are attempting

to use the Stcite Engineer's limited administrative process for a
purpose it was never intended to serve.

10. Plaintiffs1 prolix description of the alleged flooding
of their property, which reads like a "hydrologic Armageddon,"
is immaterial to the issues now before the Court on summary
judgment for the reasons heretofore discussed in Point I, supra.
Such allegations should be directed to the trier of fact on the
remaining Counts still pending below.
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In sum, Plaintiffs are not "aggrieved persons" under the
provisions of Section 73-3-14, and are not entitled to seek
review of the State Engineer's decision.

Plaintiffs do not own

any water rights and do not even allege that the subject change
would in any way interfere with other water rights.

The fact

that Plaintiffs believe the change will cause flood damage to
their land does not make them aggrieved persons under the statute.

The State Engineer does not and could not adjudicate

Plaintiffs1 damage claims, and Plaintiffs1 area of concern does
not fall within the "zone" or area to be protected by the statutory change application process (which is limited to the protection of other water rights), and the granting of summary judgment
was correct.
POINT III: The Criteria Of Section 73-3-8 Do Not Apply
To Chancre Applications Filed Pursuant To
Section 73-3-3.
Point II above demonstrates that the change application
process is narrow in scope and Plaintiffs1 interests do not fall
within the "zone" sought to be protected.

In an attempt to get

over that hurdle, Plaintiffs attempt to broaden the "zone of
interest" by arguing that the broader criteria for the approval
of new applications to appropriate water set forth in Section 733-8 (specifically the criteria regarding the public welfare) also
apply to change applications.

That argument is without merit.
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The language of Section 73-3-3, read in conjunction with
related statutes in Title 73 Chapter 3, clearly demonstrates that
the substantive criteria for the approval of change applications
is limited to whether the proposed change would impair other
vested water rights.

This interpretation is further buttressed

by the historical evolvement of Section 73-3-3, long-standing
construction by the State Engineer in processing change applications, and the caselaw.11
A.

The Criteria for Approval of Change Applications is Limited
to Those Contained in Section 73-3-3,
On the face of the relevant statutes, it is clear that the

substantive criteria for the approval or rejection of change
applications is limited to the impairment of other water rights
and is governed solely by Section 73-3-3.

On the other hand, the

broader criteria set forth in Section 73-3-8 are applicable only
to new applications to appropriate water.
Section 73-3-2 governs the filing of applications to appropriate water, and sets forth the procedures for processing (as
opposed to the substantive criteria for approving or rejecting)
such applications.

Section 73-3-8 sets forth the criteria for

approval or rejection of applications to appropriate, and provides in relevant part:
11. The amici on both sides of this case have focused
primarily on this issue. The State Engineer concurs fully in the
arguments set forth in the brief of Amici Water Users.
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(1) It shall be the duty of the state engineer to
approve an application if: (a) there is unappropriated
water in the proposed source; (b) the proposed use will
not impair existing rights or interfere with the more
beneficial use of the water; (c) the proposed plan is
physically and economically feasible, unless the
application is filed by the United States Bureau of
Reclamation, and would not prove detrimental to the
public welfare; (d) the applicant has the financial
ability to complete the proposed works; and (e) the
application was filed in good faith and not for purposes of speculation or monopoly. If the state engineer, because of information in his possession
obtained either by his own investigation or otherwise,
has reason to believe that an application to appropriate water will interfere with its more beneficial use
for irrigation, domestic or culinary, stock watering,
power or mining development or manufacturing, or will
unreasonably affect public recreation or the natural
stream environment, or will prove detrimental to the
public welfare, it is his duty to withhold his approval
or rejection of the application until he has investigated the matter. If an application does not meet
the requirements of this section, it shall be rejected.
(2) An application to appropriate water for
industrial, power, mining development, manufacturing
purposes, agriculture, or municipal purposes may be
approved for a specific and certain period from the
time the water is placed to beneficial use under the
application, . . . .
(Emphasis added; see Appendix f!Alf
for the full statute.)
The statute is clearly and specifically cast in terms of applications to appropriate new water—not changes of existing rights.
Section 73-3-3—on the other hand—deals exclusively with
changes in point of diversion, place or nature of use of an
existing right.
water.

It does not involve the appropriation of new

Section 73-3-3 governs the change application process,

and sets forth the specific criteria for their approval or
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rejection.

Section 73-3-3, in its 1985 format, provides in

relevant part:
Any person entitled to the use of water may change
the place of diversion or use and may use the water for
other purposes than those for which it was originally
appropriated, but no such change may be made if it
impairs any vested right without just compensation.
. . Both permanent and temporary changes in point of
diversion, place, or purpose of use of water including
water involved in general adjudication or other suits,
shall be made in the manner provided in this section.
No permanent change shall be made except on the
approval of an application therefor by the state engineer. Such applications shall be made upon blanks to
be furnished by the state engineer and shall set forth
the name of the applicant, the quantity of water involved, the stream or source from which the appropriation
has been made, the point on the stream or source where
the water is diverted, the point to which it is proposed to change the diversion of the water, the place,
purpose and extent of the present use, and the place,
purpose and extent of the proposed use and such other
information as the state engineer may require. The
procedure in the state engineer's office and rights and
duties of the applicants with respect to applications
for permanent changes of point of diversion, place or
purpose of use shall be the same as provided in this
title for applications to appropriate water; but the
state engineer may, in connection with applications for
permanent change involving only a change in point of
diversion of 660 feet or less, waive the necessity for
publishing notice of such applications . . . .
Applications for either permanent or temporary
changes shall not be rejected for the sole reason that
such change would impair vested right of others, but
if otherwise proper, they may be approved as to part of
the water involved or upon the condition that such
conflicting rights be acquired. (Emphasis added.) 12
12. As noted earlier, the 1986 and 1987 amendments to
Section 73-3-3 did not change any of the substantive criteria
relating to change applications.
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The reference in Section 73-3-3 to the procedures in the State
Engineer's Office regarding applications to appropriate is
clearly a reference to the procedural steps in processing the
application, such as assigning the application a file number,
publication of notice, the filing of protests, etc.

It does not

purport to incorporate the substantive criteria of Section 73-3-8
into Section 73-3-3.

This is further buttressed by the portion

of the Section which allows an exception from the normal procedure for publishing notice where the change in point of diversion
is less than 660 feet from the original point.

Combining the two

independent clauses into one sentence denotes a relationship
between the two clauses.

Thus, the publishing of notice is

directly connected with the type of procedural references in this
Section, and indicates the legislature's intent that only the
procedural requirements were being addressed.
Plaintiffs and amicus N.P.C.A. focus on the words "rights
and duties of the applicant11 in Section 73-3-3 as demonstrating
that something more than procedural requirements were intended.
But the language regarding "rights and duties" applies to the
applicant—not the State Engineer, and cannot be reasonably read
to impose the criteria of Section 73-3-8 to change applications.
Further, to apply all of the substantive criteria of Section
73-3-8 to change applications does not make logical sense.
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For

example, Section 73-3-8 requires that before a new application to
appropriate can be approved, the State Engineer must determine
"that there is unappropriated water in the proposed source." A
change application must be based on an already-existing right.
It does not make sense to apply the "unappropriated water"
criteria to change applications, since that question would have
already been answered affirmatively in the granting of the right
on which the change is based•

To apply that criteria (i.e., the

demonstration that unappropriated water exists) would mean that a
water user on fully-appropriated systems such as the Provo or
Sevier River drainages would never be able to change his point of
diversion since the system is already fully appropriated.

Other

examples of inconsistencies in applying the criteria of Section
73-3-8 to change applications are discussed in Point I.D. of the
brief of Amici Water Users.
B.

The Legislative Evolution of Section 73-3-3 Supports
Our Construction.
The legislative evolution of Section 73-3-3 supports our

position that only procedural criteria are to apply to the change
application process—not additional substantive criteria.
The change application statute was enacted in 1903 as part
of the original Utah Water Code setting up the State Engineer's
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Office (Utah R.S. 1898, Section 1276). 13

The language of Section

73-3-3 on which Plaintiffs rely was added as an amendment to the
statute in 1937. For the sake of space, we will not set forth
the full text of the statute before and after the 1937 amendment.
Copies of the statute as it appeared in the 1919 Utah Revised
Statutes, the 193 3 Utah Revised Statutes, and Utah Code Annotated
1943 are set forth fully in Appendix

fl

F".14

Prior to the 1937 amendment, the change application statute
(then Section 100-3-3, Utah Revised Statutes 1933) contained
quite detailed procedural requirements for the processing of
change applications, including expenses of publication of notice;
the form, manner, place and time periods for publication of
notice; the time, form, and filing of protests, etc.

In the 1937

amendment, all of those procedural criteria were deleted, and the
present-day language was inserted, providing that the procedures
for change applications were to be the same as for applications
to appropriate.

Thus, the present language in Section 73-3-3 was

not adopted in a vacuum.

It is clear that the legislature simply

13. Amici Water Users discuss more fully the history and
development of the State Engineer's administrative authority over
the allocation of water resources, with which we fully concur.
14. We would refer to Court to the more detailed analysis
of the 1937 amendment set forth in the brief of Amici Water
Users.
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wanted to standardize the procedural requirements for all applications before the State Engineer relating to the filing of
applications, notice, and protests.

Nothing more was intended,

and it is difficult to believe that the legislature would significantly broaden the substantive change criteria in such an
oblique manner.15
In addition, the State Engineer's Office has never interpreted the criteria of Section 73-3-8 as applying to change
applications.

In approving or rejecting a change application,

the State Engineer only considers whether other rights will be
impaired.

The State Engineer's disposition of the subject change

application is fully consistent with this long-held interpretation of the applicable statutes.

Long standing agency inter-

pretation or construction of statutes governing the agency are
given great deference by the courts in determining legislative
intent.

See Colman v. State Land Board, 17 Utah 2d 14, 4 03 P.2d

781 (1965); Wells Fargo Service Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n,
626 P.2d 450 (Utah 1981); Concerned Parents of Step Children v.
Mitchell, 645 P.2d 629 (Utah 1982); Hodges v. Western Piling &

15. The only recent amendment which added any substantive
criteria to the change application process was in 1986, when the
legislature amended Section 7 3-3-3 to allow the Division of
Wildlife Resources to file change applications on existing rights
for instream fishery purposes (Laws of Utah 1986, Chapter 40,
Section 1). However, those amendments are not relevant to the
change application now before the Court.
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Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 1986); and Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. V. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969).
C.

The Caselaw Supports Our Position that the Only Criteria
for Approval or Rejection of a Change Application is
Whether Other Rights will be Impaired.
Numerous decisions of this Court and other courts throughout

the West support the proposition that the only criteria for the
approval or rejection of a change application is whether other
water rights will be impaired.

This is not, as amicus N.P.C.A.

suggests, because the issue has never arisen in the past.

It is

a basic tenet of Western water law.
The property right in the use of water includes the
right to change the place, nature and means of use as
well as the point of diversion. But the right to
change is qualified and may not be exercised to the
injury or substantial detriment of other appropriators
. . .. Any injury must be to the water right and not
to some other property right. (Clark, Waters and Water
Rights, Section 412.2, p. 169 (1972); Emphasis added.)
Another noted commentator has stated:
To bar a proposed change of point of diversion of
water, the injury that threatens to accrue must be to a
water right . . . . The holder of a water right who
cannot show injury thereto as a result of a proposed
change in . . . point of diversion has no cause for
complaint. Nor can one who can assert no legal right
to the water complain of such a change. (Hutchins,
Water Rights in the Nineteen Western States, Vol. 1,
pp. 632-633, Misc. Pub. 1206, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture
(1971).)
Throughout the history of Utah water law, the only criteria
for approving or rejecting a change application has been whether
the change will impair other vested water rights.
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It has been

held that so long as other water rights are not impaired, changes
in existing rights contemplate a desirable result fully consistent with progress, flexibility and change, and reflect the
established policy of this arid State (American Fork Irr. Co. v.
Linke, 121 Utah 90, 239 P.2d 188 (1951)).

Changes provide the

flexibility to assure that the State's scarce water resources are
put to their highest use.

On the other hand, other water users

are entitled to have stream or groundwater conditions exist as
they did when they made their appropriations (Piute Res. & Irr.
Co. v. West Pancruitch Irr. & Res. Co., 13 Utah 2d 6, 8, 3 67 P. 2d
855 (1962); East Bench Irr. Co. v. Deseret Irr. Co., 2 Utah 2d
170, 177, 271 P.2d 449 (1954); Salt Lake City v. Boundary Springs
Water Users Ass'n. 2 Utah 2d 141, 143, 270 P.2d 453 (1954); and
United States v. Fourth District Court, 121 Utah 1, 238 P.2d 1132
(1951), rehearing denied 121 Utah 18, 242 P.2d 774 (1952)).
The only criteria the Utah courts have ever applied to
change applications is whether the change would impair other
water rights.

This Court most recently stated that rule of law

in Crafts v. Hansen, supra.

We will not here repeat the lan-

guage from that case quoted ante at p. 19 of this brief, where
this Court clearly stated that the only issue before the State
Engineer (and the courts on appeal) on change applications is
whether there is reason to believe the change can be made without
impairing other rights.

Further, the Court held that f!a change
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application cannot be rejected without a showing that vested
rights will . . . be substantially impaired11 (Crafts, 667 P.2d at
1070).
In Piute Res. & Irr. Co. v. West Pancruitch Irr. & Res. Co,,
supra, this Court stated:
The determining question is whether the storage of
this winter water in the proposed reservoir will
interfere with the established or vested rights of the
protesting lower water users . . . .
In United States v. Fourth District Court, supra, this Court
held:
[T]he district court in reviewing the engineer's
decision also has no right to adjudicate the rights of
the parties to the use of this water but can only
determine whether there is reason to believe that some
of this water can be rediverted and used as proposed by
the application without impairing the rights of others.
If it finds there is reason to so believe, the application should be granted; otherwise it should be refused.
But in any event, such approval would allow the change
only to the extent that it can be made without impairing the rights of others. (Emphasis added.)
In Salt Lake City v. Boundary Springs Water Users, supra,
this Court again emphasized that a change application should be
approved if there is no impairment of vested rights:
If the evidence shows that there is reason to
believe that the proposed change can be made without
impairing vested rights the application should be
approved . . . . A change application cannot be rejected without a showing that vested rights will be impaired. While the applicant has the general burden of
showing that no impairment of vested rights will result
from the change, the person opposing such application
must fail if the evidence does not disclose that his
rights will be impaired. (Emphasis added.)
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See also Lehmitz v. Utah Copper Company, 118 F.2d 518 (10th Cir.
1941).
This concept is also clearly recognized in other Western
States.

In Re Application of Sleeper, 760 P.2d 787 (N.M. App.

1988), dealt with nearly the identical issue now before this
Court.

In that case, the New Mexico Court of Appeals stated the

issue as:
Whether the applicable statutes allow consideration of
the "public interest" in ruling on an application for
change of purpose and place of use or point of diversion. (760 P.2d at 788.)
New Mexico had a statute governing new appropriations which, like
Utah's Section 73-3-8, allowed the New Mexico State Engineer to
consider the "public interest" in acting on new appropriations.
The New Mexico change statute allowed changes "if such changes
can be made without detriment to existing rights."

The New

Mexico Court held that the "public interest" criteria only
applied to new appropriations and not to changes:
Protestants argue that the second sentence quoted
allows the state engineer to deny any application,
including transfer of existing water rights, if it
would be contrary to the public interest. Applicants
contend that Section 72-5-7 applied only to applications to appropriate previously unappropriated surface
water, and not to transfers of rights to waters already
appropriated. We find Applicants1 argument persuasive.
It is conceded that the state engineer has traditionally and consistently construed Section 72-5-7 to
apply only to applications for unappropriated water,
and that Sections 72-5-23 and -24 apply to transfers of
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existing rights, and allow him to deny a proper application for transfer only if it would be detrimental
to other existing water rights. Long-standing administrative constructions of statutes by the agency
charged with administering them are to be given persuasive weight, and should not be lightly overturned.
. . . [T]he more long-standing the state engineer's
interpretation of construction of the statutes without
amendment by the legislature, the more likely that the
state enginer's interpretation reflects the legislature's intent.
Case law also supports the state engineer's
interpretation of the statute. "Inherent in a water
right is the right to change the place of diverion,
subject only to the requirement that the rights of
other water users not be injured or impaired thereby."
fid, at 791; Emphasis added.)
The Court concluded:
We will not distort the plain geography of a statutory
scheme to find Protestants' construction. The statutes
in force at the time of the Application did not allow
denial of the requested transfer on the basis of the
general "public interest" considerations. (Id. at
791.) 1 6
The Sleeper decision is correct and clearly supports our position
here.
In Colthorpe v. Mountain Home Irr. Dist., 157 P.2d 1005
(Ida. 1945), the Idaho Supreme Court held that in order to
prevent a change in the point of diversion or nature of use of a
water right, injury to another water right must be shown:
The injury which appellant urges against the right
of respondents to change the point of diversion and
place of use of the Lockman water is not the kind of an
16. The New Mexico Supreme Court denied certiorari on
August 2, 1988.
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injury that will prevent the making of the change. To
prevent a change in the point of diversion and place of
use of water, the injury, if any, must be to a water
right. (157 P.2d at 1008; Emphasis added.)
In Re Johnson, 300 P. 492 (Ida. 1931), dealt with a situation where a water user sought to change his point of diversion
so he would no longer convey his water through a canal he had
historically used jointly with other water users.

The other

canal users protested, claiming the applicant's withdrawal from
the ditch would place added expenses on the remaining users in
the upkeep and maintenance of the canal.

The Idaho Court reject-

ed those arguments, stating:
The term "injured," as used in the sections of the
statute referred to [citations omitted] applies to
injury to the water right of another. It has no
application to any damage or injury that may accrue to
another growing out of the fact that he is a tenant in
common of the same conduit with the owner of the water
transferred. In other words, the proximate cause of
the injury to appellant is not the change of point of
diversion, or the place of use, but the failure of
respondents to longer use the Soda canal in common with
appellant. Such injury, if compensable in damages, is
not cognizable in this proceeding, and does not prevent
. . . change in the means of conveyance, point of
diversion, or place of use. (300 P. at 494.)
See also Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 237 P.2d 116
(Colo. 1951); Longenecrger v. Carlsbad Irr. Dist. , 483 P.2d 297
(N.M. 1971); Spaeth v. Emmett, 383 P.2d 812 (Mont. 1963); and
Hollenbeck v. Granby Ditch Co., 420 P.2d 419 (Colo. 1966).
The only authority Plaintiffs can cite for their strained
reading of Sections 73-3-3 and 73-3-8 is a dissenting opinion by
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Justice Wolfe in Moyle v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 201, 176 P.2d
882 (1947).

This is hardly persuasive authority in light of the

numerous other clear holdings of this Court to the contrary.

The

statements by Justice Wolfe are even less persuasive since Movie
dealt with the value to be placed on a water right in a condemnation proceeding.

It had nothing to do with a change application,

and was not an appeal from a State Engineer's decision.

Dicta

from a dissenting opinion is pretty weak soup.17
D.

Any Change In The Criteria For The Approval Of Change
Applications Must Come From The Legislature.
As discussed above in this Point, the legislature has

clearly provided that the only criteria for the approval or
rejection of a change application is whether other water rights
will be impaired.
courts.

That rule has been consistently upheld by the

If there is to be any broadening of that criteria, it

must come from the legislature.
The hypotheticals raised by amicus N.P.C.A. (N.P.C.A. brief
at pp. 9-10, 22-23) may make for an interesting policy discussion
in a law school classroom, but they have no applicability here—
nor do they support the proposition that the criteria of Section
73-3-8 apply to change applications. N.P.C.A. obviously wishes
17. Even if the public interest criteria were applicable,
Plaintiffs here are alleging damage to their own private interests. Plaintiffs cannot equate their private interests to the
"public interest." See, e.g., Great Salt Lake Minerals & Chemicals Corp. v. Marsh, 596 F.Supp. 548, 558 (D. Utah 1984).
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such were the case, but the legislature has provided otherwise.18
If the approveil criteria for change applications is to be broadened, such amendments must come from the legislature (see Dansie
v. Lambert, 542 P.2d 742 (Utah 1975); Footnote 8, supra at p.
21; and Northwest Datsun v. Oklahoma Motor Vehicle Comm'n,
supra) •
Amicus N.P.C.A. cites J.J.N.P. v. State, 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah
1982) , for the proposition that the general public has an interest in all waters of the State, and therefore the public interest should be considered in considering change applications.
J.J.N.P. does indeed stand for the proposition that the public
has a right to use the natural waters of the State for recreation
to the extent they are in a natural watercourse.

However,

Section 73-1-1 states that the public ownership of water resources is "subject to all existing rights to the use thereof"; and
this Court in J.J.N.P. so noted.

J.J.N.P. does not stand for the

proposition that the publicfs right to use water for recreational
purposes overrides existing legally-acquired rights to divert
that water and place it to beneficial use.

The holding of

J.J.N.P. cannot logically be relied on to say that the public
18. The example of Amicus N.P.C.A. regarding Zion National
Park does not detract from our position. Those changes have been
protested by the National Park Service on the grounds that the
changes will impair its reserved water rights in the Virgin River
within the Pcirk, and the change process is available to address
that claimed impairment.
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interest is to be considered in acting on change applications
where the legislature has not provided otherwise.
In conclusion, the criteria for the approval of change
applications is governed exclusively by Section 73-3-3, and the
broader criteria of Section 73-3-8 apply only to applications to
appropriate and are inapplicable to the change application here.
CONCLUSION
The lower court properly granted the State Engineer's motion
for summary judgment and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of December, 1988.
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APPENDIX "A"
73-3-3. Change of place of diversion or use — Right to —
Permanent or temporary — Application — Contents — Investigation — Notice and hearing — Deposit to cover expenses —
Finality of decision — Violation as misdemeanor — Exception as
to replacement wells. Any person entitled to the use of water
may change the place of diversion or use and may use the water
for other purposes than those for which it was originally appropriated, but no such change shall be made if it impairs any
vested right without just compensation. Such changes may be
permanent or temporary. Changes for an indefinite length of time
with an intention to relinquish the original point of diversion,
place or purpose of use are defined as permanent changes.
Temporary changes include and are limited to all changes for
definitely fixed periods of not exceeding one year. Both permanent and temporary changes of point of diversion, place or
purpose of use of water including water involved in general
adjudication or other suits, shall be made in the manner provided
herein and not otherwise.
No permanent change shall be made except on the approval of
an application therefor by the state engineer. Such applications
shall be made upon blanks to be furnished by the state engineer
and shall set forth the name of the applicant, the quantity of
water involved, the stream or source from which the appropriation
has been made, the point on the stream or source where the water
is diverted, the point to which it is proposed to change the
diversion of the water, the place, purpose and extent of the
present use, and the place, purpose and extent of the proposed
use and such other information as the state engineer may require.
The procedure in the state engineer's office and rights and
duties of the applicants with respect to applications for permanent changes of point of diversion, place or purpose of use
shall be the same as provided in this title for applications to
appropriate water; but the state engineer may, in connection with
applications for permanent change involving only a change in
point of diversion of 660 feet or less, waive the necessity for
publishing notice of such applications. No temporary change
shall be made except upon an application filed in duplicate with
the state engineer upon forms to be provided by him, which shall
set forth the name of the water user, a description of his water
right, the nature and time of the change sought, the reason for
the change, and such other information as the state engineer may
require. The state engineer shall make an investigation and if
such temporary change does not impair any vested rights of others
he shall make an order authorizing the change. If he shall find
that the change sought might impair such rights he shall give
notice of the application to all persons whose rights may be
affected thereby and shall give them an opportunity to be heard
before authorizing the change. Such notice may be given by
regular mail five days before the hearing or by one publication
in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the
original point of diversion or place of use is located five days
before such hearing. Before making an investigation or giving

notice the state engineer may require the applicant to deposit a
sum of money sufficient to pay the expenses thereof.
Applications for either permanent or temporary changes shall
not be rejected for the sole reason that such change would impair
vested right of others, but if otherwise proper, they may be
approved as to part of the water involved or upon condition that
such conflicting rights be acquired.
Any person holding an approved application for the appropriation of water may in like manner, either permanently or
temporarily change the point of diversion, place or purpose of
use, but no such change of approved application shall affect the
priority of the original application; provided, that no change of
point of diversion, place or nature of use set forth in an
approved application shall operate to enlarge the time within
which the construction of work shall begin or be completed. The
determination of the state engineer shall be final, unless an
action to review his decision is filed within the time and in the
manner provided by section 73-3-14.
Any person who changes or who attempts to change a point of
diversion, place or purpose of use, either permanently or temporarily without first applying to the state engineer in the
manner herein provided, shall obtain no right thereby and shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor, each day of such unlawful change
constituting a separate offense, separately punishable.
The provisions of this section shall not apply to the
replacement of an existing well by a new well drilled within a
radius of 150 feet from the point of diversion from said existing
well, and no such replacement well shall be drilled except upon
compliance with the requirements of section 73-3-28.

73-3-8. Approval or rejection of application — Requirements for approval — Application for specified period of time
Filing of royalty contract for removal of salt or minerals.

—

(1) It shall be the duty of the state engineer to approve
an application if: (a) there is unappropriated water in the
proposed source; (b) the proposed use will not impair existing
rights or interfere with the more beneficial use of the water;
(c) the proposed plan is physically and economically feasible,
unless the application is filed by the United States Bureau of
Reclamation, and would not prove detrimental to the public
welfare; (d) the applicant has the financial ability to complete
the proposed works; and (e) the application was filed in good
faith and not for purposes of speculation or monopoly. If the
state engineer, because of information in his possession obtained
either by his own investigation or otherwise, has reason to
believe that an application to appropriate water will interfere
with its more beneficial use for irrigation, domestic or culinary, stock watering, power or mining development or manufacturing, or will unreasonably affect public recreation or the natural
stream environment, or will prove detrimental to the public
welfare, it is his duty to withhold his approval or rejection of
the application until he has investigated the matter. If an
application does not meet the requirements of this section, it
shall be rejected.
(2) An application to appropriate water for industrial,
power, mining development, manufacturing purposes, agriculture,
or municipal purposes may be approved for a specific and certain
period from the time the water is placed to beneficial use under
the application, but in no event may an application be granted
for a period of time less than that ordinarily needed to satisfy
the essential and primary purpose of the application or until the
water is no longer available as determined by the state engineer.
At the expiration of the period fixed by the state engineer the
water shall revert to the public and is subject to appropriation
as provided by Title 73. The state engineer may extend any
limited water right upon a showing that the essential purpose of
the original application has not been satisfied, that the need
for an extension is not the result of any default or neglect by
the applicant, and that water is still available; except no
extension shall exceed the time necessary to satisfy the primary
purpose of the original application. A request for extension
must be filed in writing in the office of the state engineer not
later than 60 days before the expiration date of the application.
(3) Before the approval of any application for the appropriations of water from navigable lakes or streams of the
state which contemplates the recovery of salts and other minerals
therefrom by precipitation or otherwise, the applicant shall file
with the state engineer a copy of a contract for the payment of
royalties to the state of Utah. The approval of an application
shall be revoked in the event of the failure of the applicant to
comply with terms of his royalty contract.

73-3-14. Review by courts of engineer's decisions. In any
case where a decision of the state engineer is involved any
person aggrieved by such decision may within sixty days after
notice thereof bring a civil action in the district court for a
plenary review thereof. The state engineer shall give notice of
his decision by mailing a copy thereof by regular mail to the
applicant and to each protestant and notice shall be deemed to
have been given on the date of mailing. The place of trial,
subject to the power of the court to change the same as provided
by lawf shall be in the county in which the stream or water
source, or some part thereof, is located. The state engineer
must be joined as a defendant in all suits to review his decisions, but no judgment for costs or expenses of the litigation
shall be rendered against him. Parties shall be served with
process as in other cases and notice of the pendency of such
action shall be filed by the clerk of the district court with the
state engineer within twenty days after the same is commenced
which shall operate to stay all further proceedings pending the
decision of the district court.

APPENDIX "B"
BEFORE THE STATE ENGINEER OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF CHANGE APPLICATION
NUMBER 57-3411 (al3077)

)
)
)

MEMORANDUM DEC

Change Application Number 57-3411 (al3077) was filed by the
Draper Irrigation Company and the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District to change the point of diversion, place and nature
of use of water rights as evidenced by Decree £3429, 57-3411
(D47), and 57-443 (A13830), titled in the name of the Draper Irrigation Company; the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District
being entitled to the use of portions of said water rights by
virtue of an agreement entered into with the Draper Irrigation
Company.
It was proposed to change one-half of the entire flow of water in
Dell Canyon (North Dry Creek), all the waters of Middle and South
Forks Cry Creek, all but 0.18 cfs. of Rocky Mouth and Big Willow
Creeks, and 1-4 cfs, of water saved as described in water user
claim 57-4 4 3 from the same sources as described above.
Water has been diverted at points as follows: North Dry CreekNorth 17o 10 f East 5020 feet, Middle Fork Dry Creek- North 23o
10" East 2420 feet, South Fork Dry Creek- North 77o 10' East 2020
feet, Big Willow Creek- South 33o 10f West 5055 feet, and Rocky
Mouth Creek- South 39o 15f West 3915 feet, all from the NE
Corner, Section 23, T3S, R1E, SLB&M, and 9,559.5 acre-feet of
water has been used from January 1 to December for domestic,
municipal, storage, industrial, and stockwatering purposes, and
from April 1 to September 30 for the irrigation of 2716 acres.
All water uses were within sections 7, 8, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25,
27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 36, T3S, R1E, SLB&M, and sections
4, 5, and 6, T4S, R1E, SLB&M.
It was proposed to divert 9,559.5 acre-feet of water from the
same sources with flow rates as heretofore, to be diverted from
points as follows: North Dry Creek- South 750 feet and East 4121
feet from the Nl/4 Corner, Section 14, Middle Fork Dry CreekSouth 2783 feet East 3225 feet from the Nl/4 Corner, Section 14,
South Fork Dry Creek- North 3 06 feet and East 992 feet from the
Sl/4 Corner, Section 14, Big Willow Creek- South 2609 feet and
West 853 feet from the Nl/4 Corner, Section 23, and Rocky Mouth
Creek- South 2389 feet and West 493 feet from the Nl/4 Corner,
Section 23, all T3S, R1E, SLB&M.
The portion of the water to be used by'the Draper Irrigation Company would be for the period from January 1, to December 31, and
would include domestic, stockwatering, commercial, fire protection, and other purposes incidental to the requirements of Draper
City, which would be provided both raw water from the mountain
streams herein described, and treated water from the Draper
Treatment Plant, which is operated by the Company. The Company
would also irrigate 1790.7 acres from April 1 to September 30.
All Company uses to be within the same area as described heretofore, together with uses in sections 25, 26, 36, T3S, RIW, S L 3 & M n n a p q n
and Section 1. T4S. RIW. ST.R^M
U U U U W U
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PAGE -2The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District proposed to use
water following treatment at itfs Southeast Regional Water Treatment Plant, from January 1, to December 31 for municipal purposes
within the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy Districts boundaries. The change application was advertised in the Deseret News
from June 28, 1984 through July 12, 1984, and was protested by
Stanley B. Donham.
A hearing was held in Salt Lake City on February 26, 1985 and was
attended by the applicants representatives, and the protestant
with his representatives. At the hearing the applicants stated
that Draper Irrigation Company had a contract with Salt Lake
County Water Conservancy District which allowed the District to
utilize portions of the Company's water for municipal purposes,
following treatment at the District's treatment plant, and that
the subject change application had been precipitated by this contractual agreement.
The protestant stated that as a result of the project construction, his property was flooded in 1983 and 1984 causing extensive
property damage, and that the now-completed project was constructed such that further flooding of this property could occur
in the future due to project maintenance, or for other causes at
the option of the District. He further stated that the District
had not obtained permits allowing them to discharge water from
their system, and that the project as constructed was detrimental
to the public welfare.
In an effort to gain additional information relative to this matter, the State Engineer's Staff conducted a field review on May
7, 1985. Representatives of both the applicant and protestant
were present for the review, which included observations of alleged damage to the protestant1s property, along with observations of the District's construction which took place in connection with temporary water rights change applications approved by
the State Engineer.
In a review of the foregoing, the State Engineer concludes that:
1.

He is without authority relative to damages which may have
been sustained in connection with project construction
which occurred as a result of his reaction to water right
applications; therefore, this issue does not apply to
this change application.

2.

The State Engineer is not in receipt of evidence indicating that existing water rights will be impaired if this
change application is implemented.

In consideration of these conclusions, it is the opinion of the
State Engineer that this application can be approved.
p

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CHANGE APPLICATION NUMDER
57-3411 (al3077)
PAGE -3This decision is subject to the provisions of Section 73-3-14,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides for plenary review by
the filing of a civil action in the appropriate district court
within sixty days from the date hereof.
Dated this 26th day of December 1985.

Robert L. Morgan, £<T., State Engineer
RLM:EDF:laz
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision this 2 6th day
of December, 1985 to:
Draper Irrigation Co.
2582 South 950 East
Draper, UT 84020
Salt
P.O.
3495
Salt

Lake Water Cons. Dist.
Box 15618
South 300 West
Lake City, UT 85115

Stanley B. Bonham
10741 Dimple Del Road
Sandy, UT 84092
James A. Mcintosh
James A. Mcintosh and Assoc.
Suite 14, Intrade Bldg. So.
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
D. Brent Rose
% Clyde & Pratt
2 00 American Savings Plaza
77 West Second South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Lee Kapaloski
% Kapaloski, Kinghorn & Peters
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake^City, UT 84111

BY: //)flS,4,P

/?

2w><g

^-t^irel A. Zunael,^Secretary
nnnnQ?.

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

FILMED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE

STANLEY B. BONHAM and ANNE M.
BONHAM, et al.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO. C-86-1341

Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERT L. MORGAN, Utah State
Engineer, et al.,
Defendants.

The Court has reviewed the file, pleadings, Memoranda, and
listened to oral argument of counsel after which the Court took
the defendant Utah State Engineerfs Motion for Summary Judgment
under advisement.
Plaintiffs1 counsel has raised several important issues. He
has suggested a more liberal interpretation of the following:

of

"aggrieved person" under Section 73-3-14, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as
amended; construction of the term "zone of interest" and its
applicability

to

this

case;

the

Engineer's

duties

and

responsibilities under Section 78-3-8, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as
amended; and application of permanent change under Section 73-33.
This

Court,

however,

cannot

agree

with

plaintiffs1

contentions.
The Court is of the opinion defendant State
position is

the correct

Engineer!s

one. As they have succinctly stated,

BONHAM V, MORGAN
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"•..the change application process is narrow in scope, is covered
exclusively by Section 73-3-3, and the only issue before the
State Engineer and this Court on appeal is whether there is
reason to believe that the change could be accomplished without
impairing other vested water rights.

The plaintiffs are not

users and have no water rights to be impaired by the subject
change; they therefore are not aggrieved parties under Section
73-3-14.
criteria

The concerns they raise are simply outside the limited
which

govern

the

approval

and rejection

of

change

applications,,"
Accordingly, the Court hereby grants defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment as to Count I.

Defendant is to prepare Judgment

pursuant to this decision.
Dated this

_day of December, 1987.

RAYMOND S. UNOv
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

BONHAM V. MORGAN
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
the

foregoing

following, this

Memorandum
*T

Decision, postage

prepaid,

day of December, 1987:

James A. Mcintosh, Esq.
1399 South 700 East, Suite 14
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Ken J. Hagen, E£q.
P.O. Box 15618
Salt Lake City, Utah

84115

Lee K. Kapaloski, Esq.
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Michael M. Quealy
Assistant Attorney General
1636 W. North Temple, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116

noG-

I

t-:
v
l ***r
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

DAVID L. WILKINSON, No. 3472
, MAR l H 1988
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
DALLIN W. JENSEN, No. 1669
Kouco'» h'nO'er! GKrff. 3«3 Oitt Court
Solicitor General
'S^epoiy Ciferk.
MICHAEL M. QUEALY, No. 2667
i
Assistant Attorney General
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT UTAH STATE ENGINEER
1636 West North Temple, Suite 300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84116
Telephone: (801) 533-4446

Cn

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STANLEY B. BONHAM and ANNE M.
BONHAM; BOYD F. SUMMERHAYS and
ARLEEN M. SUMMERHAYS,
Plaintiffs,

)

ROBERT L. MORGAN, Utah State
Engineer; SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, a political
subdivision of the State of Utah
and a body corporate? and DRAPER
IRRIGATION COMPANY, a Utah
)
corporation,

JUDGMENT AND ORDER
EXPRESSLY DIRECTING
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
PURSUANT TO RULE 54(b)

Civil No. C-86-1341
(Judge Raymond S. Uno)

Defendants.

Defendant Utah State Engineer's Motion for Summary Judgment
on Count I of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint came before
the Court for hearing on November 20, 1987. Further conferences
were held between the Court and counsel by telephone on November
30, 1987 and December 7, 1987. Plaintiffs are represented by
James A. Mcintosh.

Defendant Utah State Engineer is represented

by Dallin W. Jensen and Michael M. Quealy.

Defendants Draper

-fC-Q

Irrigation Company and Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District are represented by Lee E. Kapaloski and LeRoy S. Axland,
respectively.
The Court having reviewed the file, including the affidavits
and memoranda of counsel submitted on the present motion; having
heard and considered the arguments of counsel, and the Court
being fully advised in this matter concludes that the change application process under Section 73-3-3 U.C.A. is narrow in scope;
that the issues raised by Plaintiffs are outside the limited
criteria governing the approval and rejection of change applications; and that Plaintiffs are not "aggrieved persons" within the
meaning of Section 73-3-14 U.C.A..

The Court therefore grants

the Motion of Defendant Utah State Engineer for Summary Judgment.
Further, the Court has indicated orally in explaining its ruling
to counsel that while Plaintiffs are not entitled to bring an
action to review the Decision of the State Engineer, their protest and participation before the State Engineer has placed Defendants Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District and Draper
Irrigation Company on notice of Plaintiffs1 concerns, so as to
preserve Plaintiffs1 claim for punitive damages as pleaded elsewhere in the Second Amended Complaint.
Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED, that
Defendant State Engineer's Motion for Summary Judgment be, and is
hereby granted, and that judgment is hereby entered against
Plaintiffs, dismissing with prejudice Count I of Plaintiffs1

Second Amended Complaint, which is the only Count therein
directed at the State Engineer.

This judgment does not affect

the allegations against the other Defendants as set forth in
Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint.
The Court hereby expressly determines that there is no just
reason for delay and hereby expressly directs that this judgment
be entered as a final judgment within the meaning of Rule 54(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Each party shall bear its own costs.
DATED this /Y"

day of PcVnrM-y, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

RAYMOND S. UNO
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed JUDGMENT AND ORDER EXPRESSLY DIRECTING ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 54(b), was served by mailing the same,
first class postage prepaid, this 4th day of February, 1988, to:
James A. Mcintosh
Attorney at Law
Intrade Building South #14
1399 South 700 East
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84105
LeRoy S. Axland
Attorney at Law
175 South West Temple
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
Lee E. Kapaloski
Attorney at Law
185 South State Street
P.O. Box 11898
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84147

MICHAEL M. QraAI^X
Assistant Attorney G
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DAVID L. WILKINSON, No. 3472
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
DALLIN K. JENSEN, No. 1669
Solicitor General
MICHAEL M. QUEALY, No. 2667
Assistant Attorney General
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT UTAH STATE ENGINEER
1636 West North Temple, Suite 300
SALT LAKE CITY DT 84116
Te1eDhone: (801) 533-4446
___
IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STANLEY B. BONHAK and ANNE K.
BONHAK, BOYD F. SUMMERHAYS, AND
ARLEEN K. SUMMERHAYS,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)
)

v..

)

R03ERT L. MORGAN, Utah State
Engineer, SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, £ Political
Subdivision of the Stare of Utah
and a Body Corporate, and DRAPER
IRRIGATION COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF
KENT JONES

Civil No. C-86-1341
(Judge Raymond S. Uno)

Kent Jones, being first duly swcm upon oath, deposes and
says that:
1.

I reside at 6866 South 2350 West in "West Jordan, Utah.

2.

I am currently employed by the State of Utah, Division of

Water Rights, otherwise known as the Utah State Engineer's
Office.
3.

Within the Division of Kater Rights I hold the position

of Directing Engineer in charge of the Distribution Section.

Part of the responsibility of the Distribution Section is to keep
accurate records of all owners of water rights in the State of
Utah.
4.

At the request of the Utah Attorney General's Officef I

had a search of this Office's records conducted under my direct
supervision to determine what, if any, water rights are owned in
Salt Lake County by any of the named Plantiffs* in the abovecaptioned action*
5.

A detailed search of our records failed to show any

ownership of water rights in Salt Lake County by any of *the named
Plaintiffs in the above-captioned action.
DATED this 4th day of September, 19B7.

s
KENT
JOKES

j

STATS 0? UTAH

)
)ss.
COUKTY OF SALT LAKE)
Subscribed and sworn "to before me this 4-th dey of September,
t

1987.
Residing at:
r-Zc-Py

pC/y

Notary Puclac
//^M

O^y^

/

\

#y Commission Expires :SL,

'V
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Robert J, DeBry,
Plaintiff,
v.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(For Publication)
Case No. 870004-CA

Salt Lake County Board of
Appeals,

FILED

Defendant.
Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Jackso

t//st

r>0V//D1988,

Noorun
\ f
CtefKCitr*) Court
\ V vi&t* Court of

JACKSON, Judge:
Robert J. DeBry ("DeBry") filed a petition in this court
seeking direct appellate review of a final order of the Salt
Lake County Board of Appeals ("Board*). We dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.
DeBry proceeds from the premise that a direct "appeal- to
some court of this state from a final order of a local
governmental agency is an inherent right. However, the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and the district court's
appellate jurisdiction must be provided by statute. Utah
Const, art. VIII, § 5. Because there is no constitutional or
other statutory provision creating a right to judicial
review—in either court—of final orders of local
administrative agencies such as the Board,1 DeBry contends
our general jurisdictional statute must be interpreted as the
statutory: grant of a right of direct "appeal" to this court.
We do not' agree.
At the time DeBry's petition was filed, that statute
provided: "The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction
• . . over: (a) the final orders and decrees of state and

1. £1^ Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5 ("Except for matters filed
originally with the supreme court, there shall be in all cases
an appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a
court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause.").

APPENDIX "E"

local agencies or appeals from the district court review of
them . . . .- Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1987).2 This
general statute defines the outermost limits of our appellate
jurisdiction, allowing us to review agency decisions only when
the legislature expressly authorizes a right of review. See
State ex rel. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Manfre, 102 N.M. 241,
693 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Ct. App. 1984). It is not a catchall
provision authorizing us to review the orders of every
administrative agency for which there is no statute
specifically creating a right to judicial review. In the
absence of such a specific statute, we have no jurisdiction.3
2. The statute was recently amended by 1988 Utah Laws, ch. 73,
§ 1 (effective April 25, 1988). It now reads, in pertinent
part:
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction . . . over:
(a) the final orders and decrees
resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or
appeals from the district court
review of informal adjudicative
proceedings of the agencies . . . ;
(b) appeals from the district
court review of adjudicative
proceedings of agencies of political
subdivisions of the state or other
local agencies!.]
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (1988).
3. Our determination that this court has no jurisdiction in
this case does not leave parties without a remedy for arbitrary
-or unlawful local agency action where there is no statute
specifically authorizing judicial review. See, e.g., Utah R.
Civ. P. 65B(b)(2); Davis County v. Clearfield Citv, 756 P.2d
704, 707 (Utah App. 1988) (where there is no specific,
statutorily prescribed method for judicial review of city
council action, review is available by •'traditional means" of
extraordinary writ). See also Whiting v. Clayton, 617 P.2d 362
(Utah 1980); Peatross v. Board of Comm'rs of Salt Lake County,
555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976).

B70004-CA
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DeBry's petition is therefore dismissed.

Normal H. Jackson, ^t^dge

WE CONCUR:

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

£

AA

^^C^^O

Russell W. Bench, Judge
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IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS-GENERAL PROVISIONS. 743
^mtmttir* rtltrt. ts a rtrtat to 6Jr«*t w a t e r a t t
•ent ab«^« the point of drrrrakm of del endS r i f **>« »OT tfiat the pkainttC baa uot a n
2^mJ or aubalrtinr rifhl to the amount of w i wt %-hich be aeea* t o ©on'rey through such
mt) wbere be haa t o m e w a t e r and baa made

an application to appropriate otber unappp
prtat^d water, nor that hi* application lor u:
appropriated water w a s approved by h i m ^ l f
in hii official capacity as i t a t e e n g i n e e ^ ^
Tanner *. Proro B e n c h Canal & ljyT Co, 40
U. 10£; 121 P. W4. .

£45&. (12S&x22.) Water reverts upon *I>aixJoament. Wptt the appropriator or his successor in interest abandons or ceases t£ se water for a
period of seven years, the right ceases, and thereupop^such water reverts
to the public, and may again be appropriated, as Divided in this title; but
mestions of abandonment shall be questions ofidtt, and shall be determined
L arc other questions of fact.
R. S. *9S, 5 > K 2 ; '03, p. 101; '05, p. 160.
D*cUiont on ad^erae tiaer. note to f 1-450.
a*r*an toaes n p m to drtcn and • a a e m e n t for
a*t
by noD-uaer lor m a n y yeara,
m
SiaUs*- T. Tzraz^ 7 U. <T7: 17 P. MC
0«mer erf ©rtch Is «rtopD*d from
Hfj« of another who e n i a i r « * ditch
ecm land expecting to uae a a m e - ^ /
Uti lrr. Co. T. Movie. < TJ. j p f : S P.. 867.
fccrrtaoB T. W i n s , 17 TJ. Atjfbi
P. 7CL
Wtter hi not e«m«<! to &r abandoned by the
«*rt tact that the o w n ^ d o e s not make any
» ? cf It lor a D i m ^ r of year? and permit*
t to now onto t f c ^ a n d of another w h o does
It.
2? TJ. tZl: tl P . <7L
GUI T. H4
L Co. T . AJTUt. » TJ. 598; 7S P.
fcrrttrto

constitute an abandonment erf w a -

tej^Tpht, there must be an Intent to abandon,
upled with tome act of relinquishment, by
which the intent i i carried out.
Promontory B- Co. T. ATFile, 28 TJ. 398; 79 P.
<7.
Becker T. Marble Cr. lrr. Co., IB TJ. 225; 49
P. S91. 111S.
Non-uaer tor seven year* doe* not constitute
abandonment.
Id.
Where one who hat developed water Ine4dentally, in dlgpino a tunnel on his own land,
turns rt lnu> a stream, be does not thereby
abandon it. but may take It out a p s l n lower
down the natural stream, w i t h a proper allowance lor a«epare and eTaporation.
Herriman lrr. Co. T . S.eel, 25 TJ. 96; 69 P.
71*.

MBS. (128&x24.) Place of Aversion may be changed Vested right*
protected Any person, corporation, or association entitled to the use of
water may change the place of diversion, and may use the water for other
purposes than those for which it was originally appropriated, but no such
cb2Dge shall be made, if it impairs any vested right, without just compensation; no change of point of diversion or purpose of use shall be made except on the approval of an application of the owner by the state engineer.
Beiore the approval of an application the stare engineer must, at the expense
o? the applicant, to be paid in advance, give notice thereof by publication
22 some newspaper, having general circulation within the boundaries of the
rirer system or water source in which the point of diversion of the water
is located; such notice shall give the name of the applicant, the quantity of
water involved, the stream or source from which the appropriation has been
made,-the point on the stream or source where the water is diverted, the
point to which it is proposed to change the diversion of the water; the place,
pcrpose, and extent of present use, and the place, purpose, and extent of the
proposed use. Said ootice shall be published at least once a week for a period of thirry days. Any person, corporation, or association interesTed may,
xl any rime within thirty days after the completion of the' publication of
aid notice, nie with the state engineer a protest against the granting of
aid application for change of point of diversion or purpose of use, stating
tbe reasons therefor, winch shall be duly considered by the state engineer,
WHO shall approve or reject said application for change of point of diversion or
psrpose of use. Such application shall not be rejected solely for the reaSOn
- ^t.su^
^ f ^ g g would impair vested rights of others, but the application, n otherwise proper, maywbe approved conditionally upon such con&cnng rights being acquired. The determination of the state engineer
* ^ be final unless appeal is taken to the district court of the county in
*nicx^tiie point of the diversion of water is situated, within sixty days of no-

R. S. 98, § 1276; '03, p. 102; '05, p. 162; am'd '09, p. 90.
^ a ^ f c S y , corporations icrbidden to e x « * * itock. § X3B1, exception i n Xavcr of r a £ *•£» c o r s l e t . § :m.
L
I J?Tf*1 1 ' 1^ C T i o r m a y be changed, if it does
t / t ? * * ^ ^ otaer Tested n ^ h t a
oecr

« e o r i e m n x e p e n a power company

a »ecoiidary use of the w a t e r oi a rrver BO longas the former appropriator • 4 chal) continue to
divert it£ water at its present point of cjveraion. and to u*e ine t o e at its present
place of use," is effective, taoujrh ruci: l o n n e r
s.ppropnatcr has the a j r i t to c n ? n r e Its pia.ee
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WATEK AND IRRIGATION

br the state engineer, and shall set forth the
Bxn>e and post-office address of the person,
poration or association making the application
the nature of the proposed use for which-the J
propriation is intended; the quantity of watej
acre feet or the flow of water in second fejft to
be appropriated, and the time during whjfch it
is to be used each year; the name of the
or other source from which the water is \A be diverted; the place on such stream or source where
the water is to be diverted and the nat^e of the
diverting works; the dimensions, gT/de, shape
jad nature of the proposed diverting channel;
md such other facts as will clear}/ define the
lull purpose of the proposed appropriation. If
the proposed use is for irrigation, Jme application
*haU show the legal subdivisions ii the land proposed to be irrigated, with *£Jt total acreage
thereof and the character o f / h e soil. If the
proposed use is for developing power, the application shall show the nuxnbe/, size and kind of
irater wheels to be employed/and the head under
which each wheel is to be /perated; the amount
of power to be produced And the purposes for
*hich and the places whe/e it is to be used; also,
the point where the wa/er is to be returned to
the natural stream orAource. If the proposed
nse is for milling or npring, the application shall
sbofr the name of th/mill and its location or the
name of the mine And the mining district in
?rhich it is situat/d, its nature, and the place
Trhere the water ig to be returned to the natural
stream or sourcZ The place of diversion and
place of retura/>f the water shall be designated
with reference/to the United States survey corners or min«*al monuments, when either the
point of divZ-sion or the point of return is situated withp six miles of the nearest United
States suorey corner. The storage of water by
means of/ reservoir shall be regarded as a diversion, an/ the points of diversion in such cases
shall b / deemed to include the point where the
taken from the stream and the center of
the impounding dam of the reservoir; The lands
inundated by any reservoir shall be ded as nearly as may be, and by government
fodivisions, if upon surveyed land, and the area
(i the surface thereof when the reservoir is filled
'ihall be given.
(L. 19, p. 177, § 42.)
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approval of any such application the state engineer must, at the expense of the applicant to be
paid in advance, give notice thereof by publication in some newspaper having general circulation within the boundaries of the river system
or near the water source in which the point of
diversion of the water iB located; such notice
shall give the name of the applicant, the quantity of water involved, the stream or source from
which the appropriation has been made, the point
on the stream or source where the water is diverted, the point to which it is proposed to change
the diversion of the water, the place, purpose and
extent of the present use, and the place, purpose
and extent of the proposed use. Said notice
shall be published at least once a week for a
period of four weeks. Any person interested
may, at any time within thirty days after the
last publication of said notice, fOe with the state
engineer a protest against the granting of the application, stating the reasons therefor, which
shall be duly considered by the state engineer,
and he shall approve or reject the application for
change of point of diversion, place or purpose of
use. Such application shall not be rejected for
Ithe sole reason that such change would impair
[vested rights of others, but if otherwise proper,
it may be approved upon condition that such conflicting rights be acquired. The determination of
[the state engineer shall be final unless contested
jin court within sixty days after written notice to
[the applicant of the action of the state engineer.
[Any person holding an approved application for
{the appropriation of water may in like manner
change the point of diversion, place or purpose
use.
*
(L. 19, p. 177, § 8.),
uur* «f Pnn>o«t (Decioed prior to 1S19)—Curamt taty not
k appropriate wjtter io- oi»e pcrpoM xad "UKX a.ppjy it or
\ any pzrt of it to another ptE-po*c BIT Gocurewood Tai>V e r thick Co. v. Sbrrtli±^ 1W ? . Shi, 49 TJ. SfcS.

lOG-^V deceived," TOed" Defined.
WneneNer in this title the word "received"
is used witfc reference to any paper deposited in
[the office of\he state engineer, it shall be deemed
fto mean t h e \ a t e when such paper was first
deposited in tne state engineer's office; and
[whenever the tern "filed" is used, it shall be
[deemed to mean tnk date when such paper was
•{acceptably completeinin form and substance and
(L. 19, p. 177, § 44.)
10G-4-3. Change of Place of Diversion or Use [filed in said office, \
—Notice—Contest—Limitation of Ac100-S-5. Action by Engineer on Applications
tion.
—Procedure.
\
Any person entitled to the use of water may
On receipt of each application it shall be the
change the place of diversion or use, and may use
the water for other purposes than those for which duty of the state engineer to Viake an indorsefc was originally appropriated, but no such ment thereon of the date of itsWceipt, and to
change shall be made, if it impairs any vested make a record of such receipt in \ book kept in
right, without just compensation; no change of his office for that purpose. It shaDsi>e his duty
point of diversion, piace or purpose of use shall to examine the application and ascertain if it
be nade except on the approval of an application sets forth all the above rec;iirec f a c t ^ and if.
of the owner by the state engineer. Before the not, it shall be returned to the applicant within
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filing in office of state engineer as provided by this section. See Clark v.
North Cottonwood Irrigation &, Water
Co. of Farmington, 79 U. <25, 437, 11
P.2d 300.
The filing: of an application in state
engineer's office gives applicant an incomplete or inchoate right which he
may defend in a court of law. Tanner
v. Provo Reservoir Co., 78 U. 158, 170,
2 P-2d 107, following Robinson v.
Schoenfeld, 62 TJ. 233, 218 P. 1041.
The filing of application with Efc*te
engineer, as required by statut^^ooes
not establish appropriation^*! water.
Sowards v. Meagher, 37>8; 212, 223,
108 P. 1112.
i.

Propriety oL^proposed nse.*
Under thj^section, an appropriation
of water^eJmnot be made for the irrigation ^pi^unsnrveyed, unindosed, and un-

100-3-3.

100-3-3

occupied public domain of the TJr
States for the sole production frf^iood
for wild water fowl, since urefiect a
valid appropriation of w ^ r the beneficial use must be onelfclt inures to the
exclusive benefit .pr the appropriator
subject to his^*6*mp]ete control. Lake
Shore Duck/Ciub v. Lake View Duck
Club. 50/tL 76, 166 P. 309, L. R. A.
1918^620, applying Comp. Laws 1907,
88x6, as amended by Laws 1915,
Dh. 83.
As against a contention that water in
question could not be diverted above
riparian owner's land because he has
right in the water of said creek for
power to operate his oxygen plant, such
right is satisfied when the water reenters the creek at the tailrace of his
oxygen plant. Whitmore v. Salt Lake
City, 89 U. 3S7, 399, 57 P.2d 726.

Change of Place of Diversion or Use—Application—Notice—
Protests.
Any person entitled to the use of water may change the place of diversion or use and may use the water for other purposes than those
for which it was originally appropriated, but no such change shall be
made if it impairs any vested right without just compensation. Such
changes may be permanent or temporary. Changes for an indefinite
length of time with an intention to relinquish the original point of
diversion, place or purpose of use are denned as permanent changes.
Temporary changes include and are limited to all changes for definitely fixed periods of not exceeding one year. Both permanent and
temporary changes of point of diversion, place or purpose of use
of water including water involved in general adjudication or other
suits, shall be made in the manner provided herein and not otherwise.
No permanent change shall be made except on the approval of an
application therefor by the state engineer. Such applications shall
be made upon blanks to be furnished by the state engineer and shall
set forth the.jname of the applicant, the quantity of water involved,
the stream or Source from which the appropriation has been made, the
point on the stream or source where the water is diverted, the point to
which it is proposed to change the diversion of the water, the place,
purpose and extent of the present use, and the place, purpose and extent
of the proposed use and such other information as the sxate engineer
may require. The procedure in the state engineer's office and the rights
and duties of the applicant with respect to applications for permanent
changes of point of diversion, place or purpose of use shall be the same
as provided in this title for applications to appropriate water.
No temporary change shall be made, except upon an application filed
in duplicate with the state engineer upon forms to be provided by
him, which shall set forth the name of the water user, a description
of his water right, the nature and time of the change sought, the
reason for the change, and such other information as the state engineer may require. The state engineer shall make an investigation and
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if Buch temporary change does not impair any vested rights of others he
shall make an order authorizing the change. If he shall find that
the change sought might impair such rights he shall give notice of the
application to all persons whose rights may be effected thereby and
shall give them an opportunity to be heard before authorizing the
change. Such notice may be given by regular mail five days before
the hearing or by one publication in a newspaper of general circulation
in the county in which the original point of diversion or place of use
is located five days before such hearing. Before making an investigation or giving notice the state engineer may require the applicant to
deposit a sum of money sufficient to pay the expenses thereof.
Applications for either permanent or temporary changes shall not
be rejected for the sole reason that such change would impair vested
rights of others, but if otherwise proper, they may be approved as to
part of the water involved or upon condition that such conflicting rights
be acquired.
Any person holding an approved application for the appropriation of
water may in like manner, either permanently or temporarily, change
the point of diversion, place or purpose of use, but no such change
of approved application shall affect the priority of the original application; provided, that no change of point of diversion, place or nature
of use set forth in an approved application shall operate to enlarge
the time within which the construction of work shall begin or be completed. The determination of the state engineer shall be final, unless
an action to review his decision is filed within the time and in the manner provided by section IOC—3-14.
Any person who changes or who attempts to change a point of diversion, place or purpose of use, either permanently or temporarily without first applying to the state engineer in the manner herein provided,
shall obtain no right thereby and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,
each day of such unlawful change constituting a. separate offense,
separately punishable.
(L. 19, p. 177, § £.)
History.
As amended bv L. 37, ch. 130, e£.
liar. 19; L.H 32, ~eh. 111, e£. Mar. 20,
Tev^riring t e n Gf enure section.
This seen on was Genu. Laws 1907,
§ 12Bsx24; E. E. 1E9£, § 1253.
1.

Change of p'&ce of diversion.
.mor appropriates conic make change
in place of diversion and nse of water
which neitner enlargec nor diminished
SUT <m«rrrng right bnt merely made use
cf «*?*<ir:r*g» right at another place, without detriment or rmnairment of any
Tested right of itziior annronriator.
I^hmim v.. Utah Gorier CcL, 11B F.2d
51L
~ n e r e ccmcration distributee ^ water
to its shareholders br means of ditches,
transfer cf water to shareholders from
one ditch to another, held, not change
of plan* cf diversion. Arnold v. .crnv
inrton Cm? 1 £ P-eservoir Ass^, 64 u.
S34. 231 P. v***

2. _ Change of use.
In a case decided prior to 1919, it was
held that a landowner conic1 not appropriate water irom a d:tch for one*pnrnose and then apply it or any part of
it to another pnmose. Bag- Cottonwood
Tanner Ditch Co. T. Shnrtiifl, 49 U.
569, 164 ?. £56.
3. Extent of right.
Prior appropriates right to change
the place of diversion is not absolute
or vested right, bnt is only conditional,
since no snch change can be made if
pnblic, or any other appropriator, prior
or strbsecnent, is adversely afiected, and
neither can a prior appropriator prevent
a snbsecnent appropriator from nsing
any cf the rnapprcpnated waters of the
state to the rullest extent possible
merely becanse prior appropriator in
fnrzre may desire to change his niace
of diversion. "Dnited States T. Calcwell,

